This paper analyzes the characteristics of firms that declare board directors as independents, although the directors are not strictly independent, and examines the consequences in terms of performance and corporate governance outcomes. Based on publicly available information, eight criteria of "independence" used to examine a panel of Spanish listed firms classify 14.2% of the directors as strictly independent, whereas the firms classify 32.5% of the board as independent directors. Firms with dispersed ownership structures misclassify directors more frequently than do firms with large controlling owners. In terms of consequences, we find weak evidence of a negative relation between misclassification and a firm's future operating performance. However, no relation is found between independents' misclassification and several relevant outcomes of the primary delegated committees with monitoring roles: the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee. There is no significance with regard to the non-strictly independent measures explaining executive directors' compensation, CEO turnover, audit qualifications or earning management behavior.
Introduction
Independent directors are perceived as minimizing the potential opportunism of managers, or large controlling owners, in a principal agent setting. In the context of Anglo-American dispersed ownership, independents are key members of the board in avoiding managerial misappropriation. In the concentrated ownership setting of continental Europe, the role assigned to independent directors is to limit the extraction of private benefits by the controlling large shareholders, who usually appoint the remaining members of the board of directors. The underlying fundamental concept is that the monitoring activity of the boardroom depends on the effectiveness of the independent members. This view, which is widely accepted in the academic world (Bhagat and Black, 2002 , Dyck and Zingales, 2004 , Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 , Adams and Ferreira, 2007 , Adams et al., 2008 independent directors play a role in both dispersed ownership companies, in which the concern is how to make managers accountable to shareholders, and in companies with large controlling shareholders that must account for the interests of minority shareholders.
In line with best practices codes and guidelines, the majority of companies report increasing proportions of independents among their board members (Gordon, 2007 , Linck et al., 2009 ). Rating agencies also account for the presence of a qualified number of independent directors as an element in agency rating outputs, as Santella et al. (2006) indicate. One long-term perspective regarding the changing trend of executives and independents in US boardrooms comes from Gordon (2007) , who
indicates that from 1950 to 2005, the average percentage of independent directors has risen from 20% to levels above 70%.
Using publicly available information, our paper compares firms' declarations regarding independent directors with an unbiased measure of strictly independent board members for a panel of Spanish listed firms. In addition to the contribution of the descriptive information regarding the firms' deviation between declared and strictly independent directors, the paper also addresses the following two main questions:
Question 1: What are the characteristics of firms that misclassify independent directors more frequently?
Question 2: What are the consequences of firms declaring directors as independents when these directors are not strictly independent? This paper will examine firms' future operating performance and the outcomes of the main board committees in terms of monitoring: the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee. Any negative impact on firms' performance or on the corporate governance outcomes would mean that there is an agency problem that should be corrected with law enforcement. In addition, the lack of effect of independent directors' misclassification on firms' performance would indicate that the usual recommendations of large proportions of independents should be reexamined.
The previous empirical literature addresses the relevance and the role of independent board members, usually by considering the number of directors declared as independent (e.g., Kim et al., 2007 , Boone et al, 2007 , Coles et al., 2008 , Linck et al., 2008 , Duchin et al., 2010 . No question regarding the quality of the directors' independence was examined in these papers. However, several other papers address the qualitative aspect of the independence of the board of directors.
Independent directors who joined the board after the CEO are assumed to be less independent in and in Coles et al. (2010) . Santella et al. (2006) quantify the extent to which corporate disclosure for the financial year 2003 allows for verification of the independence of directors formally declared as independents by the 40 Italian blue chip firms. Santella et al. (2007) extend the previous descriptive results comparing financial and non-financial firms in terms of ownership structure. Byrd et al. (2009) examines a more behavioral definition of director independence to exclude problematic directors, who are unlikely to stand up to management, to test the directors' impact on firm performance and management compensation. Hwang and Kim (2009) analyze social independence between independent directors and the CEO and the implications for CEO compensation, pay performance sensitivity and turnover. Finally, Cohen et al. (2012) analyze firms that appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to the management.
Our contribution to the body of knowledge regarding strict board independence, including determinants and consequences, is threefold. First, based on the best practices definitions of independent directors, we provide a testable set of eight formal independence criteria and make the set operational for a panel of Spanish listed companies. We evaluate the strict independence of each declared independent director and find a relevant difference between strict independence and declared board independence. Second, we estimate a model to disentangle the characteristics of the companies that misclassify their independent directors. We find that the proxies of managerial control increase with the presence of non-strictly independent directors. Third, we test the impact of this misclassification on firms' future operating performance and on firms' corporate governance practices, with particular attention on the impact of misclassification in the audit committee and in the nomination and remuneration committee. We find only weak empirical evidence of a negative effect on future operating performance.
This paper begins with a discussion in the academic literature regarding the role of board independence and recommendations regarding the codes of good governance. The next section links the international recommendations and the Spanish regulation with the proposed empirical measure of independence. Section 4 includes the data description and the most relevant statistics. The governance characteristics of firms with non-strictly independent directors are discussed in section 5. Section 6 analyzes the consequences of the presence of non-strictly independent directors on future operating performance, executive directors' compensation, CEO turnover, audit qualifications, and earnings management. Section 7 presents the discussion and conclusions.
Independent directors in the codes of good governance and the previous literature
An increasing number of corporate governance codes globally propose explicit recommendations regarding the structure of boards of directors, and more specifically, regarding the desirable proportion that independent directors should hold. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) the first rule as follows: "Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors". The justification is that "effective boards of directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest".
Indeed, the proportion of independent directors has increased over time. Gordon (2007) indicates that the focus on shareholder value and stock market prices have contributed to such an increase.
More recently, Linck et al. (2009) noted the way in which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US substantially increased the presence of independents, indicating that a substantial (although smaller) increase was also detected in firms for which this act was not mandatory. However, although the previous literature analyzing the influence of independent directors on companies' behavior or performance is extensive, the literature is not conclusive. On the one hand, some studies support positive outcomes. For example, Byrd and Hickman (1992) show a positive relation between independent outside directors and shareholders' interests. Cotter et al. (1997) find that shareholders' wealth increased during tender offers when a larger proportion of independent directors were on the board. Weir and Laing (2000) report that for the UK, best corporate governance practices occur when independent directors play an important role. Benkel et al. (2006) found that a large proportion of independent directors on the board (and in the audit committee) reduced the level of earnings management, particularly for large firms.
On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found empirical evidence of a negative relation between the proportion of independent directors and firms' performance. Dalton et al. (1998) could not support a significant relationship between financial performance and board composition. In the same direction, Bhagat and Black (2002) find no correlation between the measures of long-term performance and independent directors on the board. Ferris and Yan (2007) found no relationship either between board independence and performance in mutual funds or between board independence and scandals in these firms after the SEC changed its corporate governance rules.
Bhagat and Bolton (2009) also found that larger board independence negatively affected operating performance before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; however, after passage of the act, the relationship was found to be positive and significant.
Several theoretical developments have attempted to clarify the role played by board independence, developing what could be called an optimal board independence theory (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998 , Raheja, 2005 , Adams and Ferreira, 2007 , Harris and Raviv, 2008 , Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008 . This theory shows that board independence is not always in shareholders' interest, partially explaining the apparently conflicting empirical evidence found regarding the role of board independence. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) show that past performance is a determinant of optimal board independence. In well-performing firms, it is in the shareholders' interest to allow boards with less independent directors. Several empirical papers on board composition provide evidence consistent with the optimal board independence theory (e.g., Linck et al., 2008 , Boone et al., 2007 , Coles et al., 2008 . In addition, the previous literature that controls for this endogeneity problem finds that board independence is in shareholders' interest when independence aligns with the optimal board independence theory. These findings are supported by Duchin et al. (2010) , who analyze the effect of regulatory modifications regarding board independence, and by Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) , who analyze the effect of the sudden deaths of independent directors. Adopting a different methodology by using laboratory experiments, Gillette et al. (2003) indicate that board independence is in the shareholders' interest even when noninformed independent directors are present.
However, to empirically determine the impact of board independence, we require an accurate measure of the firms' strict independence level. Our approach relies on the formal independence criteria reported publicly by the firms. These criteria differ from the informal independence criteria that consider social ties, i.e., Hwang and Kim (2009) , or that excludes as independents the directors involved in scandals in previous years. i.e., Byrd et al. (2009) . Unlike Santella et al. (2006 Santella et al. ( , 2007 , who analyze whether disclosure is sufficient to corroborate the declared independence by firms, our formal independence approach applies to all directors in an explicit and measurable way. This approach allows us to detect the characteristics of firms that are more prone to misclassify directors as independents than others, and the consequences of such misclassification.
What should an independent director be?
The observed number of independent board directors comes from the firm's self-classification when filing the required forms according to their country or stock market regulations or disclosing their corporate governance report. The Spanish Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies specifies that independent directors are "directors appointed for their personal or professional qualities who are in a position to perform their duties without being influenced by any connection with the company, its shareholders or its management". The spirit of this definition does not differ from the current definitions in the NYSE, the European Union or the UK regulations. Nevertheless, the details in the definition that international regulatory bodies propose as independent directors' characteristics are heterogeneous. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra's (2009) comparison of corporate governance codes notes that the definitions of independent director change across countries and even across firms. proprietary directors, independent directors and others. The ARCG also includes information on the board members' relationship with significant shareholders, the firm, its associates and subsidiaries.
The ARCG allows us to empirically test eight independence criteria for all directors declared as independent. These criteria, shown in table 2, can be interpreted as international standard definitions specifically focused on the Spanish regulation as stated in table 1. The selection of these criteria, based on the Spanish mandatory definition of independent directors and the international standards, is adapted to the availability of public information to check the majority of the aspects of this definition ii . Criterion 1 addresses the 2007 Spanish corporate governance code that states that the appointment by the nomination committee is compulsory for the director to be classified as independent. Nevertheless, international best practices codes include the recommendation of giving this committee tasks such as the appointment of the independent directors. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found empirical evidence that CEOs' involvement in the appointments of new directors when no nomination committee existed yielded more 'gray', non-strictly independent directors with conflicts of interest. Limited tenure of up to twelve years is the second criterion, which is also included in the UK combined code and the EU recommendations. The six remaining criteria are standard in the international regulations, as table 2 confirms. The third criterion restricts independence to those directors who do not have a significant business relationship with the company. The relationship with the controlling shareholders is an element that the Spanish code, the NYSE rules and other codes define as essential for the independence of directors. The condition of being a director, a manager or employee of a significant shareholder (fourth criterion), having other types of relevant relationship (i.e., family) with a significant shareholder (fifth criterion), or receiving compensation by the company, its subsidiaries or its associates, for other functions apart from the directorship (sixth criterion) must exclude the director from being qualified as a real independent member. Companies can also be formally board members through a representative, although the seventh criterion obviously does not accept this type of director as an independent. Our last criterion, the eighth, avoids classifying as independent any recent company executive. Table 2 summarizes these criteria, showing the fit with the corresponding rule in the codes revised in 3 shows that the average percentage of declared independent directors in both commissions is substantially higher than the percentage of independents on the board (one-half versus one-third, respectively). However, after filtering the non-strictly independent directors, these percentages decrease significantly. The declared average of 49.4% of independent members in the audit committee and the average of 50.4% in the nomination and remuneration committee decrease to 21.2% and 24.1% of strictly independents, respectively.
The majority of firms appointed a declared independent director for the chair of both committees, although on average less than one-third of firms were chaired by strictly independent directors.
Panel E indicates that the rate of misclassified independents in these committees is decreasing over time. Nevertheless, for the year 2009 the proportion of strictly independents is always below 50%
when one-third of the firms still have non-strictly independent directors chairing these committees.
One-sixth of the firms have non-strictly independents chairing both committees. These findings remain relevant in firms of all sizes and industry activities. Table 3 captures the values of the dependent variables in the empirical model of misclassification.
In a step further, these measures of non-strictly independent directors become a part of the set of explanatory variables of the operating performance model and also of the models of executive directors' pay, CEO turnover, audit qualification and earnings management. The descriptive statistics show that the average ownership concentration is high. Non-reported
Pearson correlation coefficients show high values among variables such as sales and market capitalization, both proxies of firm size, and are also positively correlated with board size.
The governance of firms with non-strictly independents
Firms controlled by managers may appoint non-strictly independent directors to achieve the regulator's recommended level of board independence and to reach the desired level of board real independence (a friendly board). In firms controlled by large block holders, independents are supposed to protect the interest of minority shareholders, and large shareholders may also use nonstrictly independents to achieve a desired low level of real board independence at the same time as the recommended level of declared board independence. Therefore, we analyze whether ownership structure and managerial control proxies are firm characteristics related to the presence of nonstrictly independent directors.
We use the ownership of the largest shareholder (C1) as a proxy of ownership concentration (it is highly correlated with the accumulated ownership of the three and five largest shareholders, 0.92 and 0.84, respectively). As proxies of managerial power, we use the following: a dummy variable to identify firms in which the CEO also chairs the board of directors; a dummy variable to detect firms with voting caps (a maximum number of votes that a shareholder may facilitate); board size (to detect board coordination problems in its monitoring functions, Yermack, 1996) ; the percentage of busy non-executive directors (those with three or more directorships, with no time to properly monitor executives, Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) ; and the percentage of interlocked executive directors (serving in a second firm as non-executives with a non-executive director of the first firm serving as executive, Hallock, 1997) . Finally, we add size (the log of sales) and year and industrial sector fix effects to detect any systematic differences in the presence of non-strictly independents related to such factors.
Using these explanatory variables, we estimate logit models in which the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm has at least one non-strictly independent director. Table 5 shows the results of the following three logit specifications: pooled logit models with robust standard errors clustered by firm (Huber-White) , panel data random effects logit models, and generalized estimating equations (GEE) logit models (Liang and Zeger, 1986, and Zeger and Liang, 1986) to account for any persistence in the decision to have misclassified directors within the same firm.
iii This method is equivalent to feasible generalized least squares for lineal models. The panel data models show 50 replication bootstrap standard errors to obtain robust statistical inference (Mooney and Duval, 1993) . iv Models 1, 4, and 7 include one proxy of shareholder power (C1) and managerial power (CEO chairs the board). Models 2, 5, and 8 include the remaining corporate governance variables and practices. Because board size might proxy firm size, we also estimate models 3, 6, and 9
without this variable as a robustness test.
[ Insert table 5] The models in table 5 clearly show that the stronger the control by the largest shareholder is, the lower the proportion of firms misclassifying independents is. v We also obtain weak empirical evidence (for the pooled logit models) of a positive interaction among firms with non-strictly independents and voting caps limiting the power of potential new entrant shareholders. Board size is also positively related to non-strictly independents, except in the GEE panel data logit specification.
In sum, the empirical evidence of these logit models suggests that large shareholders do not use non-strictly independent directors to decrease independents' influence. Firms controlled by managers (with dispersed ownership structures) tend to reduce real board independence with nonstrictly independents. However, this scenario does not imply that the managerial power is the ultimate reason for the widespread presence of non-strictly independent directors in our sample. The optimal board independence theory may be this ultimate reason. For example, our results may be explained by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) , who found that it is optimal in shareholders' interest to reduce board independence for CEOs with positive records of past performance. Whenever the optimal board independence level of a firm is below the recommended level of board independence, firms have incentives to use non-strictly independent directors to achieve the optimal level of real board independence at the same time as the recommended level of declared independence.
Therefore, we next analyze the consequences of independents' misclassification in terms of future firms' performance and in terms of several relevant outputs of the main board committees with monitoring roles, which include the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee. Negative consequences will be interpreted as support for the managerial power approach, whereas positive consequences or a lack of consequences will support the optimal board independence theory.
Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) show that the contribution to the firm value by independent directors is greater when the directors play relevant roles on the board committees, particularly on the audit committee. Under the Spanish Securities and Market Law, all listed firms must have an audit committee, whereas the Spanish corporate governance code merely recommends the presence of a nomination and remuneration committee (86% of observations, firm/year).
The impact of non-strictly independents in the boardroom
Based on the agency theory, the approach regarding the relevance of independent directors in the boardroom is that the monitoring of managerial power is a key element in preventing shareholders' wealth expropriation. A potential manager's expropriation behavior is more influential under dispersed ownership structures, where shareholders' coordination is difficult and costly, than under concentrated ownership structures. For firms without significant large owners, our findings show that incentives to appoint non-strictly independents are stronger. To examine whether this scenario is harmful to shareholders, the following sections analyze the impact of directors' misclassification on future operating performance and the consequences for the outcomes of the supervisory board committees. First, for the nomination and remuneration committee, we test whether executive directors' compensation practices and CEO turnover are dependent on the level of non-strictly independent directors. Second, for the audit committee, we test whether the number of non-strictly independent directors affects firms' audit qualification and earnings management behavior.
6.1.Future operating performance
If non-strictly independent directors are appointed to mask an agency problem among managers and owners (or large and minority owners), we should expect a negative impact on firm future performance. As operating performance, we evaluate return on assets, calculated as the net income plus interest payments, net of tax effects, over the amount of the previous year's total assets. The following five measures capture the power of non-strictly independents: the proportion of nonstrictly independent directors over board size; the proportion over the committee size of non-strictly independent directors in the nomination and remuneration committee and in the audit committee;
and two dummy variables to identify firms in which the chair of these committees is a non-strictly independent director. Given the relevance of the ownership structure found in the previous section, these measures are also interacted with the ownership of the largest shareholder to investigate any different impact of non-strictly independents. This interaction is also conducted in our posterior analyses. The structure of the model and the control variables follow Hwang and Kim (2009) : the measure of firm size is the log of sales, and growth opportunities are taken as one period lagged market to book ratio. To capture the potential impact of an uncontrolled agency problem we use the ownership structure and a group of board of directors and corporate governance characteristics.
Ownership structure proxies are the ownership stake of the largest shareholder, the ownership of executive directors and the shares owned by non-executive directors. The board of directors' characteristics are a dummy variable to identify firms in which the CEO chairs the board, the percentage of executive directors, the presence of "golden parachutes" to protect executive directors against dismissals (Brick et al, 2006) , the board size to detect board coordination problems (Yermack, 1996) , the percentage of busy directors with dedication problems (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) , and the percentage of interlocked executive directors to detect the potentially lower monitoring effort of non-executive directors (Hallock, 1997) . We also control whether directors conduct relevant economic transactions with the firm as a potential rent extraction mechanism; this condition is particularly relevant in our sample given the predominance of owner-controlled firms (Faccio et al, 2001 ). We estimate these models with time and firm fixed effects to control for any systematic time effect and control for non-observable constant firm characteristics affecting future firm performance. Inference is based on Huber-White robust t statistics. We include one period lagged return on assets to address any endogeneity concern; however, the results do not change without this variable (available on request).
[Insert table 6]
The initial 752 firm/year observations decrease to 667 because of the lags in the market to book ratio; missing values are generated by mergers and acquisitions in the period and the new listing firms that do not report lagged values. vi When information on the nomination and remuneration committee is used, the sample decreases to 580 firm/year observations because 14% have no such committee. Table 6 shows that the presence of misclassified independent directors is not related to future operating performance except when a non-strictly independent director chairs the board committees, although with low statistical significance. In this case, future operating performance tends to be lower (models 4 and 5) than for firms with strictly independents chairing these committees. When interacting the non-strictly independents variables with the ownership stake of the largest shareholder we do not detect relevant differences, except the higher statistical significance of the negative effect of a non-strictly independent chairing the audit committee.
vii The results remain robust using different specifications as the model of future operating performance used in , which includes the variance of past operating performance and one period lagged sales as control variables instead of the lagged market to book ratio and of contemporaneous sales.
viii Criticism of the performance models in corporate finance occurs primarily regarding the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables or regarding the omission of relevant variables.
Although our panel data estimations tend to uncover these issues, additional measures of the impact of non-strictly independents on the outcomes of board committees are analyzed. The expected outcomes of a properly performing nomination and remuneration committee include, among others, a scenario in which the presence of non-strictly independents does not distort executive compensation or CEO turnover. Similarly, for the audit committee, given the lack of agency problems because of non-strictly independent directors, we do not expect that the presence of nonstrictly independents affect the external auditor qualifications or the earnings management behavior of the firm.
6.2.Executive director compensation
In this section we analyze the relation between non-strictly independent directors and the average individual compensation of executive directors, giving special attention to non-strictly independents in the nomination and remuneration committee. The conjecture in this case would be that amid agency problems related to non-strictly independents' control in the nomination and remuneration committee, executive compensation would be larger compared to firms without non-strictly independents in the boardroom. The proposed model of compensation includes fixed pay, bonuses, cash from exerted stock options, retirement benefits, and any additional remuneration from the firm.
The structure of control variables follows with size (the log of one period lagged sales), growth opportunities (the average of the past three years' market to book ratio), past performance (one period lagged ROA and stock return), and risk (the variance of the past three years' ROA and stock return) as the economic determinants of compensation based on firm characteristics (see also Lambert and Larcker, 1987 , Core and Guay, 1999 , Jackson et al., 2011 , Cyert et al., 1997 , Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999 . The model then considers the ownership structure and other corporate governance characteristics as proxies of a potentially uncontrolled agency problem. The measure of ownership structure is, as previously, the amount of the ownership stake of the largest shareholders, the ownership of executive directors and of non-executive directors (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 , Hartzell and Starks, 2003 , Elston and Goldberg, 2003 , Sun et al., 2009 The results do not detect a relation between non-strictly independent directors and executive compensation, even in the nomination and remuneration committee. The interaction between the misclassification measures and the ownership structure also generates no statistically significant results. Models with the lagged dependent variable as an additional control variable to address potential endogeneity or estimations dropping corporate governance controls except non-strictly independents measures do not bring any significance to the non-strictly independent measures.
x Therefore, we must conclude that no malfunction is detected in the full board of directors and on the nomination and remuneration committee regarding executive compensation when non-strictly independent directors are present. xi
CEO turnover
The evidence regarding the use of independent and outside directors as a method of increasing turnover-sensitivity to past performance is mixed, as indicated by Franks et al. (2001) . CEO turnover and board independence are treated as substitute mechanisms in Easterwood et al. (2012) subsequent to firm underperformance. The Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) [Insert Models account for the percentage of non-strictly independent directors over board size, the percentage of non-strictly independent directors in the nomination and remuneration committee, and a dummy variable for the non-strictly independents chairing this committee. We also include control for the corporate governance variables used in previous models.
xiii
The results show no statistically significant relation between non-strictly independent directors and CEO turnover events. These results remain when panel data random effects logit models with bootstrap standard errors are estimated. xiv CEO turnover events are less probable when the CEO chairs the board of directors (1% statistical significance in models 1 and 3, and 5% in model 2 of table 8) and the higher the proportion of executive directors is (10% statistical significance in models 2 and 3). Finally, the higher probability of CEO turnover after firm underperformance is reduced the larger the size of the board of directors is (5% statistical significance in model 1, 10%
in models 2 and 3), consistent with monitoring coordination problems. 
6.4.Audit Qualifications
There is evidence that board and audit committee independence affects the control of managers through the quality of accounting information. Anderson et al. (2004) suggest that more independent audit committees provide a measurable and significant benefit to firms because these committees provide more reliable accounting information and affect the cost of debt. Knechel and Willekens (2006) argue that independent board members apply pressure to enhance the external audit function. Independent board members may be more concerned about their personal exposure if managers misbehave. Therefore, these members are more interested in an extensive audit activity to minimize the risk of managerial misbehavior, which could affect the members' personal reliability. For firms with non-strictly independent directors, the pressure on reliable accounting information is expected to be lower compared to boards without misclassified independents.
The external auditor opinions in the annual financial report, available for the audited firms, allow us to analyze whether the presence of non-strictly independents, particularly in the audit committee, is related to the probability of a qualified opinion (not clean). We follow the empirical model of audit qualification by Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2005) estimate the logit empirical model in a reduced sample of audit qualifications with a matching sample (see also Dopuch et al., 1987) . For each firm, we use the first audit qualification (31 observations). The matching sample selection is among firms with no audit qualification in the same industry and year with the closest amount of sales. A firm enters into the matching sample just one time.
[Insert table 9] Table 9 shows the estimation of the empirical logit model of audit qualifications on this reduced sample with robust (Huber-White) standard errors and year and industrial sector fixed effects.
xvi Models 1 to 3 in table 9 measure non-strictly independence as the percentage of non-strictly independent directors over board size, the percentage of non-strictly independent directors in the audit committee over its size, and a dummy variable to identify firms in which the chair of the audit committee is a non-strictly independent director. The results show no statistically significant relationship among non-strict independence and audit qualifications. In models 4 to 6 of table 9, the interaction term between the independents' misclassification measures and the ownership of the largest shareholder also show no statistically significant relations. Control variables are omitted in table 9, where the measures of operating performance and liquidity are statistically significant (both at 5% of confidence level) and behave as expected: the lower the operating performance and the liquidity (current assets over current liabilities) are, the higher the firm failure risk is, and the higher the probability of financial statements audit qualification is.
Additional estimations to check the robustness of the previous findings include a logit model in the full sample (674 observations) with panel data random effects. In addition, a set of GEE panel data logit models have been tested to account for any unobserved persistence in the residuals, with no statistically significant relation found between non-strictly independents and audit qualifications. 
6.5.Earnings Management
Klein (2002) suggests that boards structured to be more independent are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process. This assertion is based on evidence that reductions in board or audit committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accruals. Xie et al. (2003) find a particularly relevant role of the audit committee in the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. Therefore, if the presence of non-strictly independent directors is the result of an uncontrolled agency problem, we may expect more earnings management, particularly with non-strictly independents on the audit committee.
Earnings management may be indicative of information provision or information manipulation.
Some previous accounting studies used discretionary accruals models to decompose the proxies of earnings management into an information component and a manipulation component (Jones, 1991) .
Given the criticism of these models (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995, Guay, Kothary and Watts, 1996) , however, recent accounting literature introduced a regression approach to decompose the informative component of earnings management from the manipulative component (Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012) . We follow this approach to detect the manipulation component of earnings management through the fundamental determinants of the informative portion as differences in firms' underlying business process or in the length of the operating cycle (Dechow, 1994) .
Following Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) and Leuz et al. (2003) , earnings management is defined as the absolute value of accruals (ACC) divided by the absolute value of cash flows from operations. The use of accruals is interpreted as managerial discretion to conceal true economic performance from outsiders (Healey and Wahlen, 1999) . Cash flow from operations is defined as operating income minus accruals. Accruals are calculated as follows:
where ∆CA it is the change in total current assets for firm i in year t, ∆Cash it is the change in cash,
∆CL it is the change in total current liabilities, ∆STD it is the change in debt included in current liabilities, and Dep it is the depreciation and amortization expense.
These accruals are naturally affected (with no manipulation of information) by differences in firms' operating cycle, the credit of suppliers, the volatility of the operating environment, capital intensity, and profitability (Dechow, 1994 , Dechow and Dichev, 2002 , Hribar and Nichols, 2007 .
Consequently, we include the following as explanatory variables of earnings management: the sum of days receivable and days inventory (operating cycle), days payable (the credit of suppliers), the variance of ROA in the previous three years (the volatility of the operating environment), fixed assets over total assets (capital intensity), and a dummy variable to identify firms with negative net income (profitability). xviii Aligning with Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012), we also include differences in growth opportunities (the average of the market to book ratio over the previous three years), in size (the log of sales), and in leverage (long-term debt over total assets) as additional determinants.
From the initial sample of 752 observations, we eliminate banks (78 observations) given this sector's special regulations on financial reporting and 89 additional observations because of missing data on stock market information for new firms and new listings in the stock market (firms resulting from mergers and acquisitions are analyzed as a new entity), which results in a sample of 585 observations.
[Insert table 10] Table 10 shows the estimated empirical model in which the dependent variable is the log of the earnings management measure, and omits the coefficients of control variables. The key explanatory variables are the percentage of non-strictly independent directors over board size, the percentage of non-strictly independents in the audit committee over its size, a dummy variable to identify firms with a non-strictly independent chairing this committee, and the interaction of these variables with the ownership of the largest shareholder. Controlling for the above mentioned variables, no significant relation is found between earnings management and the presence of misclassified independent directors. Consistent with Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) we find that reporting losses and financial leverage are positively related with earnings management and that growth opportunities are negatively related with earnings management.
The estimation method, pooled OLS with year and industrial sector fix effects and robust t statistics (Huber-White) clustered by firm, is selected to be comparable with Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) .
Alternative estimations with firm fix effects also leave the measures of independents misclassification as non-significant to explain earnings management. Finally, when the measure of lagged earnings management is used as an additional explanatory variable to address endogeneity, no differences are detected. The results are available upon request.
Discussion and conclusions
According to the optimal board independence theory, non-strictly independents in the boardroom could be explained as the adjustment to the recommendations of regulators and shareholder advocates regarding the desirable level of independents on the board through corporate governance codes (the declared level) when the level is higher than the optimal degree of independence (strictly independents).
Under this theory, an endogenously determined higher power of executives or of the CEO in front of shareholders would induce a stronger presence of non-strictly independents. Effectively, according to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Boone et al. (2007) , the higher this power is, the lower the optimum level of board independence for shareholders interest is.
xix
The findings in table 5 indicate that the stronger the managerial power is, the higher the probability of non-strictly independents in the boardroom is.
However, the presence of non-strictly independent directors when managers have stronger power has two explanations. First, this scenario can indicate an uncontrolled agency problem that is harmful to the firm, thereby increasing agency costs and negatively affecting firm performance.
Alternatively, this presence can be a way to adjust the oversizing of declared independents to the optimal independence level, hence without negative impact on the firm performance.
Our findings in table 6 show weak evidence of the impact of non-strictly independents on the board on future operating performance. Effectively, the proportion of non-strictly independents on the board of directors, on the nomination and remunerations committee or on the audit committee does not affect future operating performance. Nevertheless, when non-strictly independent directors preside over either committee, we obtain weak empirical evidence of a negative impact on future operating performance.
The supervisory role of both committees is reinforced by regulators in the best practices codes of good governance, which recommend that committees should be chaired by an outside independent director and have a significant proportion of independents among their members. The supervisory role of the nomination and remuneration committee is particularly valuable with regard to two decisions: executive compensation and CEO removal when the firm underperforms. Our results in table 7 show that the presence of non-strictly independents in the boardroom or in the nomination and remuneration committee does not affect board executives' compensation and also does not affect whether this committee is chaired by a non-strictly independent director. Similarly, the usual impact of poor performance on the CEO rate of turnover is neither enhanced nor reduced by the presence of non-strictly independents on the board, on the committee or chairing the committee, as We address the supervisory behavior of the audit committee in the following two specific actions:
the level of audit qualifications and the firms' earnings management. In table 9 , we show that none of the measures of a lack of strict independence explain the observed level of audit qualifications.
Regarding the impact on the measure of earnings management and the level of accruals, the models from table 10 behave as usual in the accounting literature and the measures of non-strict independence do not affect this relationship.
Based on these findings, the appointment of non-strictly independents in the boardroom appears to comply with the required proportion of independents suggested by the codes of good governance.
Because these non-strictly independents on the main board committees do not negatively affect decisions, this approach provides support for the optimal board independence theory. The managerial power approach receives weak empirical support based on the fact that the chairing of these committees by a non-strict independent director decreases operating performance.
In sum, this paper provides a set of eight criteria to determine the strictness of the independence of the declared independent directors according to the Spanish regulation, which we demonstrate is in line with international standards on the definition of independent directors including NYSE standards, the European Union Commission, and the UK corporate governance code. The empirical measure of these eight criteria on a panel of listed firms in the Spanish stock market shows that the level of misclassifications of independent directors is more than 50%. This level of non-strict 26 independence is decreasing over time and affects firms of all sizes and industries. Firms with more dispersed ownership appoint non-strictly independents more frequently than firms with large significant shareholders. However, the presence of non-strictly independent directors does not affect several relevant outputs of the main board committees in terms of monitoring and only weak empirical support is found for a negative relation with future operating performance. Therefore, low support is found for the managerial power origin of non-strictly independents. Stronger support is found for the optimal board independence theory, in which firms appoint non-strictly independents to simultaneously achieve the optimal real independence level and the recommended independence level. The large amount of independents recommended in corporate governance codes does not necessarily improve corporate governance practices, and conversely, may provide firms with incentives to appoint non-strictly independents.
Jackson, S., Lopez, T., Reitenga, A. (2011) A director should be considered to be independent only if he is free of any business, family or other relationship, with the company, its controlling shareholder or the management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgment.
The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers to be independent. The board should determine whether the director is independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director's judgment. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination.
Directors appointed for their personal or professional qualities who are in a position to perform their duties without being influenced by any connection with the company, its shareholders or its management.
An Independent director is not (a)
The director is, or has been within the last three years, an employee of the listed company, or an immediate family member is, or has been within the last three years, an executive officer of the listed company.
(b)
The director has received, or has an immediate family member who has received, during any twelve-month period within the last three years, more (a) not to be an executive or managing director of the company or an associated company, and not having been in such a position for the previous five years; (b) not to be an employee of the company or an associated company, and not having been in such a position for the previous three years, except when the nonexecutive or supervisory director does not belong to senior management and has been elected to the (supervisory) board in the context of a system of workers' (a) has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;
(b) has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;
(c) has received or receives (a) Past employees or executive directors of group companies, unless 3 or 5 years have elapsed, respectively, from the end of the relation.
Those who have received some payment or other form of compensation from the company or its group on top of their directors' fees, unless the amount involved is not significant. Dividends or pension supplements received by a director for prior employment or professional services shall not count for the purposes of this section, provided such supplements are non contingent, i.e. the paying company has no discretionary power to suspend, modify or revoke their than $120,000 in direct compensation from the listed company, other than director and committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service).
(c) (A) The director is a current partner or employee of a firm that is the listed company's internal or external auditor; (B) the director has an immediate family member who is a current partner of such a firm; (C) the director has an immediate family member who is a current employee of such a firm and personally works on the listed company's audit; or (D) the director or an immediate family member was within the last three years a partner or employee of such a firm and personally worked on the listed company's audit within that time.
(d)
The director or an immediate family member is, or has been with the last three years, employed as an executive officer of another company where any of the listed company's present executive officers at the same time serves or served on that company's compensation committee.
(e)
The director is a current employee, or an immediate family representation recognized by law and providing for adequate protection against abusive dismissal and other forms of unfair treatment; (c) not to receive, or have received, significant additional remuneration from the company or an associated company apart from a fee received as non-executive or supervisory director. Such additional remuneration covers in particular any participation in a share option or any other performance-related pay scheme; it does not cover the receipt of fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred compensation) for prior service with the company (provided that such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service); (d) not to be or to represent in any way the controlling shareholder(s) (control being determined by reference to the cases mentioned in Article 1(1) of Council Directive 83/349/EEC (1)); (e) not to have, or have had within the last year, a significant business relationship with the company or an associated company, either directly or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body having such a relationship. Business relationships include the situation of a significant supplier of goods or services (including financial, legal, advisory or consulting services), of a significant customer, and of organizations that receive significant contributions from the company or its group; (f) not to be, or have been within the last three years, partner or employee of the additional remuneration from the company apart from a director's fee, participates in the company's share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company's pension scheme; (d) has close family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or senior employees;
(e) holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies;
(f) represents a significant shareholder; or has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election.
payment, and by doing so would be in breach of its obligations.
(c) Partners, now or on the past 3 years, in the external auditor or the firm responsible for the audit report, over the said period, of the listed company or any other within its group.
(d)
Executive directors or senior officers of another company where an executive director or senior officer of the company is an external director.
(e)
Those having material business dealings with the company or some other in its group or who have had such dealings in the preceding year, either on their own account or as the significant shareholder, director or senior officer of a company that has or has had such dealings. Business dealings will include the provision of goods or services, including financial services, as well as advisory or consultancy relationships.
(f) Significant shareholders, executive directors or senior officers of an entity that receives significant donations from the company or its group, or has done so in the past 3 years. This provision will not apply to those who are merely trustees of a Foundation receiving donations.
(g) Spouses, partners maintaining an analogous affective relationship or close relatives of one of the company's executive directors or senior officers.
(h) Any person not proposed for appointment or renewal by the Nomination Committee.
(i)
Those standing in some of the situations listed in a), e), f) or g) above in relation to a significant shareholder or a shareholder with board representation. In the case of the family relations set out in letter g), the limitation shall member is a current executive officer, of a company that has made payments to, or received payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company's consolidated gross revenues.
General Commentary to Section 303A.02(b): An "immediate family member" includes a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers and fathers-inlaw, sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person's home. When applying the look-back provisions in Section 303A.02(b), listed companies need not consider individuals who are no longer immediate family members as a result of legal separation or divorce, or those who have died or become incapacitated.
In addition, references to the "listed company" or "company" include any parent or subsidiary in a consolidated group with the listed company or such other company as is relevant to any determination under the independent standards set forth in this Section 303A.02(b). present or former external auditor of the company or an associated company; (g) not to be executive or managing director in another company in which an executive or managing director of the company is non-executive or supervisory director, and not to have other significant links with executive directors of the company through involvement in other companies or bodies; (h) not to have served on the (supervisory) board as a non-executive or supervisory director for more than three terms (or, alternatively, more than 12 years where national law provides for normal terms of a very small length); (i) not to be a close family member of an executive or managing director, or of persons in the situations referred to in points (a) to (h); apply not only in connection with the shareholder but also with his or her proprietary directors in the investee company. Proprietary directors disqualified as such and obliged to resign due to the disposal of shares by the shareholder they represent may only be re-elected as independents once the said shareholder has sold all remaining shares in the company. A director with shares in the company may qualify as independent, provided he or she meets all the conditions stated in this Recommendation and the holding in question is not significant. Tenure as independent director for up to twelve years (h) (f)
[3] Not having a significant business relationship with the company (b) (e) (b) (e)
[4] Not holding a directorship, to be a manager or an employee of significant shareholder or a shareholder with board representation
[5] Not having other relevant relationship (different than those in point 4) with significant shareholder or a shareholder with board representation
[6] Not being a director or executive in subsidiaries or associated companies (c) B (a) (e) (
[7] Not to be a company as board director
[8] Not being executive director of the firm in the previous year ** (a) (a) (a) (a) * In 2007 the CNMV (the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission) modified the information requirements regarding director proposals. Firms must communicate who proposed every director, except for independent directors. Therefore, after 2006 we assume that all independent directors have been proposed by the nomination committee, except when this committee does not exist, or if the director has not been formally renewed and was not promoted by this committee before 2007.
** As we have information starting from 2004, this criterion does not operate for this year. Table 3 The strict independence of directors. Panel A: "% declared" is the average percentage of independent directors over board size declared by firms in their Annual Report of Corporate Governance (ARCG). The remaining percentages refer to the average of strictly independents over the board size once pass the eight joint independence criteria [1. Table 4 Descriptive statistics of firms' characteristics: mean, median and standard deviations. NCR refers to the nomination and remuneration committee, AC refers to the audit committee. Average Executive compensation is the total compensation, of any kind, of executive directors divided by the number of executive directors on the board. CEO turnover refers to the percentage of cases where there is a change of a CEO between two consecutive years. Audit qualification captures the "not clean" opinion of the external auditor (no data for banks). Loss is a dummy variable for the firms that report losses in the earnings statement. Leverage is the level of long term debt over total assets (no data for banks). Liquidity (current assets over current liabilities, no data for banks). Operating Cycle is the sum of days receivable and days inventory (no data for banks, neither Days payable). Capital Intensity (fixed assets over total assets, no data for banks).
Executives' ownership and Non-executives' ownership is the sum of the ownership stakes of executive and non executive directors respectively. C1 is the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder, CEO is board Chair is a dummy variable to identify firms where the CEO chairs the board of directors. Board size is the number of directors, Tenure is the average number of years that board executives remain in board since their appointment. "Operations directors-firm" is a dummy that captures if the firm reports having transactions or commercial operations with the firm directors. "% busy non-executive directors" (a director is busy if she holds a position in three or more boards of directors) is computed over board size, as it is the percentage of interlocked executive directors (those who are also nonexecutive directors in a firm where a non-executive director of the first firm is an executive director Table 5 Corporate governance and non-strictly independents. The dependent variable takes value 1 when a firm has a director that does not meet the eight criteria for independence described in table 2. Panel A shows Pooled logit model estimations with Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( , 1982 and Duval, 1993) . Panel C presents the GEE panel data logit models allowing correlation among the error terms of the same firm, with 50 replications bootstrap standard errors. The explanatory variables are the logarithm of sales, the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder, a dummy variable detecting if the CEO also chairs the board of directors, the board size, a dummy variable identifying firms with voting caps (a maximum number of votes that a shareholder may exercise independently of the number of shares she has), the percentage of busy nonexecutive directors (a director is busy if she holds a position in three or more boards of directors), the percentage of interlocked executive directors (those who are also non-executive director in a firm where a non-executive director of the first firm is an executive director), dummy variables for industries (6) Table 6 Future firm's performance and independents' misclassification. Firm fixed effects panel data regressions of future Return on Assets one year ahead explained by the percentage of misclassified independents on the board of directors, in the nomination and remuneration committee (NRC), in the audit committee (AC), and a dummy variable to identify firms where the chair of the previous committees is a misclassified independent director. Models 6 to 10 also contain the previous variables interacted with the ownership of the largest shareholder (C1). Control variables (omitted to save space) are the log of sales, the log of lagged market to book ratio, the lagged return on assets, and the following Corporate Governance variables; the percentage of shares owned by executives, by non-executives, and by the largest shareholder of the firm, a dummy variable identifying whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, the size of this board, the percentage of executives in this board, a dummy variable identifying whether directors have done commercial transactions with the firm, the percentage of busy non-executive directors (a director is busy if she holds a position in three or more boards of directors), the percentage of interlocked executive directors (those who are also a non-executive director in a firm where a non-executive director of the first firm is an executive director), a dummy variable identifying where there are golden parachutes protecting top executives against dismissal, and a dummy variable identifying firms where there are voting caps (a maximum number of votes that a shareholder may exercise independently of the number of shares she has). Year dummy variables are introduced. Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( , 1982 robust t statistics are in parenthesis. Models 2,4,7 and 9 have a lower number of observations since just 86% of observations (firm/year) have nomination and remuneration committee.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
% non-strictly indep. Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level Table 7 Executives' compensation and non-strictly independents. Firm fixed effects panel data estimation. Dependent variable: log of average individual executive board members' remuneration. The key explanatory variables are the percentage of non-strictly independents on the board, in the nomination and remuneration committee (NRC), and the chairing of the NRC by a non-strictly independent. Control variables (omitted for space considerations) are one period lagged log of sales, stock return, and of return on assets (ROA), the average of the market to book ratio in the previous three years, the variance of ROA and the variance of stock return for the three previous years. Corporate governance control variables (omitted) are the percentage of shares owned by executives, by non-executives, and by the largest shareholder of the firm, a dummy variable identifying whether the CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, the board size, the percentage of executives on the board, the average tenure of executive directors, a dummy variable identifying whether directors have done commercial transactions with the firm, the percentage of busy non-executive directors (a director is busy if she holds a position in three or more boards of directors), the percentage of interlocked executive directors (those who are also a non-executive director in a firm where a non-executive director of the first firm is an executive director), a dummy variable identifying where there are golden parachutes protecting top executives against dismissal, and a dummy variable identifying firms where there are voting caps (a maximum number of votes that a shareholder may exercise independently of the number of shares she has). Year dummy variables are introduced. Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( , 1982 Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level Table 8 CEO turnover and independents misclassification. GEE panel data logit models allowing persistence in the residuals with Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( , 1982 robust t statistics (in parenthesis), where dependent variable is a dummy variable to identify CEO turnover events. The key explanatory variables are one period lagged stock return, one period lagged percentage of non-strictly independents on the board of directors, in the nomination and remuneration committee (NRC), a dummy variable to identify firms where the chair of the previous committee is a misclassified independent director, and its interaction with the lagged stock return. Control variables (omitted to save space) are lagged one period; percentage of shares owned by executives, by non-executives, and by the highest shareholder of the firm, a dummy variable identifying whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, the size of this board, the percentage of executives in this board, a dummy variable identifying whether directors have done commercial transactions with the firm, the percentage of busy non-executive directors (a director is busy if she holds a position in three or more boards of directors), the percentage of interlocked executive directors (those who are also a non-executive director in a firm where a non-executive director of the first firm is an executive director), a dummy variable identifying where there are golden parachutes protecting top executives against dismissal, and a dummy variable identifying firms where there are voting caps (a maximum number of votes that a shareholder may exercise independently of the number of shares she has), and the interaction between these variables and one period lagged stock return. Finally, industrial sector and year dummy variables are introduced. Chi 2 is a Wald test of the statistical significance of all the explanatory variables.
(1) (2) Table 9 Audit Qualifications and independents' misclassification. Logit models with Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( , 1982 robust t statistics (in parenthesis), where dependent variable is a dummy variable to identify a qualified opinion of the external auditor in the annual financial report. The key explanatory variables are the percentage of non-strictly independents on the board of directors, in the audit committee (AC), a dummy variable to identify firms where the chair of the previous committee is a misclassified independent director, and its interaction with the ownership of the largest shareholder. Control variables (omitted to save space) are the ownership of the largest shareholder, return on assets, leverage (long term debt over total assets), the log of sales, the size of the board of directors, the ownership of executive directors and of non executive directors, and Liquidity (current assets over current liabilities). Finally, industrial sector and year dummy variables are introduced. All models are estimated with a sample of 31 first audit qualifications with a matching sample by year, industrial sector, and sales. Chi 2 is a Wald test of the statistical significance of all the explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level Table 10 Earnings management and independents' misclassification. Pooled OLS regression with year and industry fixed effect models with Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( , 1982 robust t statistics (in parenthesis), clustering by firm (Petersen, 2009) . Dependent variable: the log of absolute value of accruals over absolute value of operating cash flow. The key explanatory variables are the percentage of non-strictly independents on the board of directors, in the audit committee (AC), a dummy variable to identify firms where the chair of the previous committee is a misclassified independent director, and its interaction with the ownership of the largest shareholder. Control variables (omitted to save space) are a dummy variable to identify firms reporting negative net income, Operating Cycle as the sum of days receivable and days inventory times 10 -4 , Days Payable multiplied by 10 -4 , the average of the market to book ratio in the previous three years, the log of sales, the variance of ROA using the annual data of the three previous years times 10 -2 , leverage (long term debt over total assets), and Capital Intensity (fixed assets over total assets). Year and industrial sector dummy variables are also introduced.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level ii The potential bias of our empirical test of independence is toward the overestimation of true independence, never toward an excess of strictly non independents.
iii See Ballinger (2004) for a description of this method in organizational research.
iv Huber-White standard errors are not feasible for logit panel data models with random effects.
v Even basic statistics are consistent with this result: 497 observations (firm/year) belong to firms in which the largest shareholder owns less than half of shares; in 77.4% of these observations there are non-strictly independent directors.
The largest shareholder owns more than half of the shares in 255 observations and in 54.9% of them there are misclassified independent directors. vi
In section 6, firms resulting from mergers and acquisitions are analyzed as new entities.
vii Table 6 does not show control variables due to space constrains. Among these variables, the one period lagged market to book ratio, is the only one that has a statistically significant coefficient in all models (positive, with 5% or 1% statistical significance depending on the model).
viii Results omitted for space considerations are available on request.
ix There may be significant differences between CEO compensation and other executive compensation, and the number of executive directors may distort mechanically the average compensation of executive directors, our dependent variable. The number of executive directors may control for this mechanical effect, and it is in our model through the board size and the percentage of executive directors. Furthermore, the introduction of the number of executive directors as an additional explanatory variable does not affect the results. Results are available on request.
x These estimations are available upon request. Unreported results also show that non-strictly independent directors in the audit committee are also not statistically related to executive directors' compensation. In The Spanish standardized Annual Report of Corporate Governance does not explicitly identify the CEO. Our identification procedure includes five steps. First, it is when a firm declares that the top executive of the firm chairs the board (441 identifications). Second, for firms without chair-CEO duality, the CEO is identified as the "Consejero Delegado" among board directors (214 CEOs identified). Third, if no CEO is still identified, the figure of "director general" among the list of non-director top executives is taken as CEO (41 CEOs). Fourth, if the CEO is still not identified the top executive director is selected (49 CEOs). In seven observations (year/firm) no CEO is still identified;
however, the CEO of the posterior year is the same as the CEO of the previous year, and she/he is identified as the with a less independent board as an optimal output for shareholders' interest.
